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DRUG REVIEW "BEHIND THE CURTAIN":
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STRUVE
James T. O'Reillyt
INTRODUCTION
The architecture of accident compensation does not mesh well
with the architecture of regulatory product approval. Accident com-
pensation, which occurs through public jury trials, is overtly adver-
sarial and virtually transparent. In contrast, regulatory product
approval,1 which occurs through specific negotiation between the
product sponsor and the regulatory body, is cooperative and con-
sciously opaque. 2 Indeed, the content of regulatory negotiations re-
mains hidden behind the curtain, shrouded in confidentiality
rationales.3 Consequently, giving regulators a potentially determina-
tive say in tort suits is highly problematic.
A decade-old debate is raging in product liability law over the
proper role of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of pre-
scription drug designs and attendant warnings. Participants disagree
about whether such approval establishes a "floor" or a "ceiling" that
limits the sponsor's duty of care.4 Into this debate steps Professor
Catherine Struve, whose excellent article 5 offers wall-to-wall coverage
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Traditionally, regulatory product
approval has set a floor, which is a minimum level for the sponsor's
duty of care.6 Accordingly, courts or juries in tort cases could find
t Volunteer Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1 Product approval includes the approval of new drug applications. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(a) (2000).
2 Details of negotiations are not publicly disclosed to protect the confidentiality of
product sponsors. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (2000) (excluding trade secrets from public
reporting requirements of federal agencies); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b) (2007) (bar-
ring the FDA from publicly disclosing a drug application until an approval letter has been
sent to the drug sponsor).
3 For example, Freedom of Information Act exemptions are available to the FDA.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)-(5) (2000); see also 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE § 14:93 (3d ed. Supp. 2007).
4 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi et. al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation, 24 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1437, 1478-79 (1994) (arguing that approval should establish a ceiling on
manufacturers' duty of care).
5 Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction
Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning kDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1039
(2008).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) cmt. e (1998); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with ... an administrative regula-
tion does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take
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that reasonable care requires drug makers to use safer ingredients,
additional warnings, or more stringent controls. 7 Courts have permis-
sibly imposed such heightened duties of care for decades while the
FDA has been reluctant to take sides.8 But recently, as Professor
Struve notes, the FDA has viewed its approval as creating a ceiling with
its sharp swing toward supporting the preemption doctrine, which in-
terposes a defense for drug makers whose drugs have received FDA
approval.9
Support for implied preemption1 ° appears to be in fashion
among conservative political leaders because it can extinguish liability
suits.II Bush Administration appointees include recent FDA Commis-
sioners Andrew von Eschenbach and Mark McClellan-both Bush
supporters from Texas12-as well as conservative FDA counsel. 1
3
These and other Bush appointees have led to a shift in FDA policy,
which now supports the implied preemption doctrine. Yet, despite
this shift, drug industry advocates have failed to persuade skeptical
additional precautions."); see also Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Inju-
ries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1973) (describing the FDA policy of creating an "irreducible
minimum" of risk to certain patients).
7 The landmark case establishing the additional duty to warn is Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984). Indeed, the traditional rule was that "'compliance
with regulations or directives as to warnings, such as those issued by the United States Food
and Drug Administration .... may not be sufficient to immunize the manufacturer or
supplier of the drug from liability.'" Plenger v. Alza Labs., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 819 n. 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973)).
8 In fact, the FDA consistently rejected preemption prior to 2006. See James T.
O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA 's Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics and a Diminished
Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 967-72 (2008) (outlining the history of the
preemption doctrine in medical products liability cases).
9 See Struve, supra note 5, at 1040-42; see also Requirements on Content and Format
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan.
24, 2006).
10 The preamble to the new labeling regulation acknowledges that Congress has not
expressly provided for preemption, but it argues that Congress has impliedly provided for
preemption because preemption allows the FDA to consistently apply the federal drug
labeling regulations. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922; see also Timothy Ardiz-
zone, Comment, The FDA: Advocate or Regulator of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 763, 766-68 (2006).
11 See, e.g., Daniel E. Troy, The Case forFDA Preemption, in FEDERAL PREEMPrION: STATES'
PowERs, NATIONAL INTEREsTs 81, 100-05 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2007).
12 Von Eschenbach was an official at the University of Texas. See Bio of Andrew von
Eschenbach, M.D., http://www.fda.gov/oc/voneschenbach/bio.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2008). McClellan's family held significant public offices in Texas. See Lisa Trei, Bush Nomi-
nates Mark McClellan to Head the FDA, STAN. REP., Oct. 1, 2002, http://news-service.stanford.
edu/news/2002/october2/fda-102.html.
13 SeeJeanne Lenzer, FDA's Counsel Accused of Being Too Close to Drug Industry, 329 BRIT.
MED. J. 189, 189 (2004) (describing criticisms of FDA counsel Daniel Troy, a Bush
appointee).
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judges to adopt the doctrine. 14 Consequently, drug industry advo-
cates have now turned their support to an approach based on primary
jurisdiction, which Professor Struve discusses in her article. 15 Profes-
sor Struve prudently avoids embracing these advocates' positions. 16
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTIcAL DIMENSIONS
I concur with Professor Struve's thorough review of the constitu-
tional issues surrounding primary jurisdiction. There has been ample
writing on the Seventh Amendment issues and on the constitutional
conflicts that arise in preemption cases, 17 and she admirably covers
the cases in the field. Professor Struve constructs hypothetical legisla-
tion as a helpful paradigm for evaluating the agency's role in the con-
text of jury trials.' 8 Her analysis is an interesting exercise in what-if
legislating. Realists, however, would observe that many congressional
decision makers were once state legislators19 and thus likely remain
opposed to federal bureaucrats preempting state remedies. This op-
position may well be one reason why Congress has never expressly
adopted the preemption doctrine. Indeed, opposition on the part of
Congress and the plaintiffs' bar 20 combines to make the discussion of
such legislation hypothetical, not imminent.
But beyond Professor Struve's exploration of the constitutional
issues surrounding what could be done are the practical constraints on
what should be done. No drug or medical device can be perfectly risk-
free.2 ' Even worse, some have extensive, serious risks of harm that
manufacturers understate or improperly explain to prescribing physi-
cians. Consequently, some patients will inevitably become victims of
unreasonably harmful or badly-prescribed drugs and medical devices.
And of course, some of those victims will ultimately seek
compensation.
14 SeniorJudge Jack Weinstein, for example, called the FDA's new preemption claims
not persuasive." Souther v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 489 F. Supp.
2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
15 See Struve, supra note 5.
16 See id.
17 See, e.g., JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE & LOCAL LAw § 12.5
(2006).
18 See Struve, supra note 5, at 1064-66.
19 For example, 39 Senators and 236 Representatives in the 109th Congress had previ-
ously served in state legislatures. See MILDRED AMER, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 109TH CONGRESS:
A PROFILE, at CRS-3 (2006), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/
RS22007.pdf.
20 See Louis M. Bograd, Taking on Big Pharma-and the FDA, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 30.
21 The classic description in tort law is that some prescription drugs are "unavoidably
unsafe." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). If such drugs have a net
social benefit and appropriate warning labels, however, they can be sold on the market
without the seller being held strictly liable for the resulting harm. Id.
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The Bush Administration policy supporting preemption is as
much about economic loss shifting as it is about politics. Precluding
compensation to victims decreases drug sponsors' insurance costs,
2 2
and thus increases the potential profitability of engaging in the high-
risk quest of making novel, effective drugs. Absolute bars to recovery
in tort claims involving FDA-approved drugs and medical devices,
through preemption, would save hundreds of millions of dollars in
transaction costs including insurance and legal fees. Congress surely
recognizes this economic loss shifting, and yet-despite the efforts of
drug industry lobbyists23-Congress has declined to expressly pre-
empt state tort actions involving prescription drugs in the same man-
ner as it has preempted similar actions involving nonprescription
drugs. 24
THE HYPOTHETICAI.. LEGISLATION
Professor Struve addresses hypothetical legislation that would de-
fine an additional task for the FDA, namely, acting as the "primary
jurisdiction" gatekeeper for tort suits involving drug and medical de-
vices.2 5 In a procedure analogous to those created under state laws,
which compel medical screening boards to review malpractice claims
initially, a plaintiff would have to wait while the drug label or design at
issue was referred "to the FDA for a non-binding advisory determina-
tion."26 Presumably, a drug sponsor would gain a great advantage if
the FDA found that sponsor's product reasonably formulated or that
sponsor's label appropriate.
The problem with this hypothetical legislation is that it is hard to
imagine an FDA determination that would not favor the defendant,
because the FDA previously approved the drug, device, or label at is-
sue. An FDA bureaucrat would implicitly admit failure by formally
blessing a lawsuit that alleges that an FDA-approved drug or device
was unsafe or inadequately labeled. The likelihood that a highly
politicized FDA management would support plaintiffs in product lia-
bility actions during a conservative administration is minimal. And
even under a more liberal administration, bureaucratic self-esteem is
22 It decreases insurance costs by decreasing the demand for products liability insur-
ance. This demand shift, however, likely lags behind the creation of new legislative shields,
as pre-enactment injuries would continue to be litigated for several years. Industry advo-
cates successfully lobbied for new legislation in Ohio in 2005, but decreases in insurance
costs did not occur immediately upon enactment. See generallyJames O'Reilly, 2005 OHIO
TORT REFORM 23-28 (2005) (describing the reforms).
23 See, e.g., Bograd, supra note 20, at 20.
24 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 751, 21 U.S.C. § 379r (2000) (expressly
preempting state tort actions involving nonprescription drugs, but remaining silent on pre-
emption of state tort actions involving prescription drugs).
25 See Struve, supra note 5, at 1064-66.
26 Id. at 1064.
[Vol. 93:10751078
DRUG REVIEW "BEHIND THE CURTAIN"
so great that the FDA would still probably decline to support plaintiffs,
because supporting plaintiffs would be supporting claims contrary to
the prior approval of bureaucratic peers.
The hypothetical legislation creates a new form of adjudication
that transforms the FDA from the gatekeeper of product approval into
the gatekeeper of private tort actions. 27 Why would the FDA concede
weakness in its own approval process, which allowed such products
and labels into the market in the first place? Furthermore, the lives of
plaintiffs and FDA regulators likely intersect only once, whereas the
lives of defendant manufacturers and FDA regulators intersect repeat-
edly. And the "critical path" process will move FDA regulators and
defendant manufacturers even closer together through Reagan-Udall
Institute research grants. 28 Moreover, users of the "revolving door,"
which has led FDA counsels and other leaders to move in and out of
the ranks of drug industry advocates, 29 would be directly offended by
decisions supporting plaintiffs' claims that a drug or device was unsafe
or inadequately labeled.
ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTIONS
Professor Struve's enlightening article makes several important
points that will help courts navigate this swamp of uncharted territory.
I agree with her that FDA approval is "at most, prima facie evidence"
of a drug's safety, 30 but I am even more skeptical than she is about the
wisdom of foreclosing jury review of tort claims involving prescription
drugs and medical devices. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is
flawed because it is based on the same erroneous assumptions about
the FDA approval process that underlie parallel arguments for the
preemption doctrine-arguments that drug industry advocates have
pressed during the current Bush Administration. 31
Indeed, the primary jurisdiction doctrine suffers the same flaws as
the preemption doctrine, which I address elsewhere in this issue.3 2 In
the climax of a classic motion picture, the Wizard of Oz spoke to
27 See id.
28 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 770, 121 Stat. 823, 891 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379dd). The Reagan-Udall Founda-
tion, created by statute, provides for collaborative research opportunities between the FDA
and drug companies. See id. Commentators have criticized the venture, as they remain
suspicious of the agency working closely with those that it is meant to regulate. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Miller, Innovating the FDA-With the Drug Industry's Help?, HUFFINGTON POST,
Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-a-miller/innovating-the-fda-
wit_b_72490.html (identifying criticisms of the program but ultimately supporting it).
29 See Troy, supra note 11, at 106 n.4.
3o Struve, supra note 5, at 1049.
31 See, e.g., Souther v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 489 F. Supp. 2d
230, 273-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Bograd, supra note 20, at 30.
32 See generally O'Reilly, supra note 8, at Part XIII.
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frightened pilgrims in a booming voice, accompanied by smoke and
majesty. But when the heroine's dog unveiled a small, old man
manipulating the mechanical image from behind a curtain, Oz's
booming voice warned, "Pay no attention to that man behind the cur-
tain!"33 In the same way, the defense bar, in search of a preemption
defense, 34 has urged courts to defer to the FDA review process and to
pay no attention to its hidden weaknesses. Importantly, the preemp-
tion defense can leave injured consumers without any recourse. If a
plaintiff claims that the FDA overlooked the flaws in a drug, the defen-
dant responds that primary jurisdiction requires deference to the ini-
tial FDA approval. And if the plaintiff claims that the FDA was misled
when it issued its initial approval, the defendant responds by citing
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Com-
mittee35 to bar any recourse. Checkmate!
IMPERFECTIONS OF THE APPROVAL PROCESS
Ironically, the drug industry has spun around from its years of
opposition to FDA regulatory decisions, recently asserting that the
new drug approval process is pure and deserving of deference, now
that approval is a potential defense in medical tort cases. 36 Studies, 37
congressional reports,38 and news coverage, 39 however, have shown
that the prescription drug approval process is imperfect and quite sus-
ceptible to influence, leading to drug approval based on questionable
efficacy claims. This showing undermines the drug industry's asser-
tion that the new approval process is pure and deserving of deference.
33 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Warner Bros. 1939).
34 See, e.g., Troy, supra note 11, at 106 n.4.
35 531 U.S. 341 (2001). Under Buckman, federal law preempts a plaintiffs state tort
claim if the plaintiff asserts that the FDA was misled. See id. at 348.
36 Prior to current preemption assertions, drug defendants opposed the deferential
acceptance of FDA drug application decisions. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. FDA, 606
F.2d 1307, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
37 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY. FDA NEEDS TO FURTHER
ADDRESS SHORTCOMINGS IN ITS POSTMARKET DECISIONMAWUNG PROCESS (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07599t.pdf; FDA, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK
(2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b-02-
01_FDA Report on Science and Technology.pdf; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES,
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY. ACTION STEPS FOR CONGRESS (2006), available at http://www.
iom.edu/Object.File/Master/37/331 / 11750-report-briefcongress.pdf.
38 Recent congressional reports critical of the FDA drug process include MINORITY
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON Gov. REFORM, SPEC. INVESTIGATION Div., PRESCRIPTION FOR HARM
(2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060627101434-98349.pdf.
39 Published criticism of the FDA drug approval process has been frequent among
advocates for patients. See e.g., Allison Torres Burtka, Jurors and FDA Scientists Lack Confi-
dence in Agency, Surveys Say, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, at 20; Robert K. Jenner, Rezulin: Fast Track to
Failure, TRIAL, July 2000, at 39; Rita Rubin, FDA Called 'Cozy' with Drugmakers, USA TODAY,
June 11, 2007, at 7D; Carmel Sileo, FDA's Oversight of Drug Trials is Dangerously Lax, Report
Says, TRIAL, Dec. 2007, at 17.
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Moreover, it makes the drug industry seem Oz-like, given its aversion
to allowing plaintiffs to reveal the behind-the-curtain claims that led to
approval, instead hoping to reveal only the booming voice of the ap-
proval decision.
Experienced skeptics will object to the suggestion that primary
jurisdiction somehow permits the FDA to "intermediate" tort claims,
just as they have loudly objected to the preemption doctrine. 40 Such
skeptics might point out that current time limits on reviews and cer-
tain intra-agency incentives 41 have strengthened the drug industry's
influence over the drug approval decision. The new 2007 Reagan-
Udall Institute process further strengthens this influence. 42 And the
drug industry has now gained influence over critical FDA post-ap-
proval remedy decisions, such as whether to require additional warn-
ings and restraints on the distribution and prescription of newly
approved drugs.43
I applaud Professor Struve's recommendation for a greater evi-
dentiary exposition of the FDA, which would allow juries to weigh
some of the weaknesses in the approval process. This would certainly
be an improvement. Yet, despite the benefits inherent in Professor
Struve's proposal, a better recommendation would be to make no
change at all. As is the case in most other product liability contexts,
the current approach allows juries to weigh all of the competing fac-
tual and opinion evidence.
WHAT REALLY OccuRs
Under Professor Struve's hypothetical legislation, a plaintiff faces
"dismissal of the claim as a matter of law if the plaintiff failed to present
evidence to rebut an FDA finding in the defense's favor on safety or causa-
40 See e.g., Allison M. Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for Eradicating State
Tort Law, 34 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 308 (Mar. 27, 2006).
41 Reviewer incentives inside the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research tend
to favor approval without recycling the application-i.e., without making further demands
for data from the drug sponsor. This ensures that the reviewer can satisfy the specified
time periods for application clearance under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act. Review-
ers are hesitant to recycle an application because of "strong criticism the agency has re-
ceived for prolonged review times." See CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RESEARCH, NEW DRUG
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: REFUSAL TO FILE 2 (1993), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
guidance/rtf.pdf.
42 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 770, 121 Stat. 823, 891 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379dd); see supra note 28 and accom-
panying text.
43 Negotiations between the FDA and drug sponsors are vulnerable to legislative pro-
visions that have increased the sponsor's ability to argue against additional testing require-
ments. See § 104, 121 Stat. at 832. Recent amendments to the drug application process




tion."4 4 This would be a novel adjudication 45 in which the FDA would
likely struggle to decide the cause of death or illness in the time allot-
ted. Of course, causation is fact-specific. And the vast majority of re-
ports to official databases such as MedWatch and the Manufacturer
and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) are unwieldy and un-
filtered narrative paragraphs, or forms.4 6 In most cases, these reports
do not lead the FDA to dispatch a local inspector, and a physician
specializing in pathology or disease causation rarely assesses the plain-
tiff's medical records.
The typical person files a MedWatch report to the FDA without
substantive interaction with the agency. Indeed, the FDA remains pas-
sive if the reporting person marks "Product Use Error" or "Product
Problem" in Box B-1 on FDA Form 3500. 4 7 Under the primary juris-
diction doctrine, only after a plaintiff files suit-perhaps as long as
twelve to twenty-four months after injury and six to twelve months af-
ter the court processes the initial pleadings-would the district court
formally refer the case to the FDA. Presumably, the FDA would then
have several months to respond.
FUNDING THE COLD CASE SQUAD
The hypothetical legislation sets up a new process of adjudication
by the FDA. A "cold case squad" of FDA physicians would try to deter-
mine the causation of the plaintiffs' injuries from MedWatch narra-
tives or the MAUDE database files. To perform this new process of
adjudication, the FDA would require more funding for field office
staff, more funding for specialists, and more funding for a dedicated
expert team to examine MedWatch entries from several years before
the initial FDA finding. This would result in three separate versions of
causation: the plaintiffs, the defense's, and the FDA's-the latter be-
ing the least funded and least timely of the three.
44 Struve, supra note 5, at 1066 (emphasis added).
45 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, this is an "adjudication" because it is a
fact-specific determination concerning specific persons' injuries. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)
(2000).
46 MedWatch and Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) are
the principal FDA databases for reporting adverse health effects of drugs and medical de-
vices. MedWatch, which gathers reports from doctors and patients and disseminates im-
portant safety information through its website, is available at http://www.fda.gov/
medwatch/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). MAUDE, which contains voluntary facil-
ity, distributor, and manufacturer reports involving medical devices, is available at http://
www.fda.gov/cdrh/maude.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
47 Form 3500 is available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY/3500.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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THE HUMAN AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS
We must consider the human consequences of investing substan-
tial FDA reviewer time and field inspector resources to produce a find-
ing that would most likely favor the defendant manufacturer.48
Under the above scenario, the injured party must either go uncom-
pensated and bear the loss or survive on government disability pay-
ments (which the government can never recoup from the accused
tortfeasor). Although the defendants and defense counsel profit, the
plaintiffs' counsel-likely working for a contingency fee-go unpaid,
and are therefore deterred from pursuing future drug cases.
We must also consider the opportunity costs. For example, every
dollar that the FDA spends on saving a defendant from facing a jury
trial is another dollar that the FDA is not able to spend on application
or labeling review for new drug products. Moreover, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act might allow plaintiffs to appeal for injunctive relief
from FDA findings, further draining FDA resources. 49
THE LESSER OF Two EviLs
Primary jurisdiction, like implied preemption, limits the ability of
drug and device victims to obtain tort compensation. 50 Nonetheless,
primary jurisdiction is a kinder, gentler version of preemption. In-
stead of an abrupt preemptive strike that absolutely prohibits compen-
sation, primary jurisdiction is an affirmative defense that allows for
judicial balancing.5 1 Professor Struve's hypothetical legislation allows
the trial judge to hear both sides argue about the primacy of the
FDA's opinions on the safety of a drug or medical device, and the
product's causal relationship to the plaintiff's injury.52 The judge can
then opt to defer to the "primary" wisdom of the FDA, which might
result in dismissal.5 3 Alternatively, the judge could opt to let the jury
hear the FDA's safety and causation opinion.5 4
When making key decisions on primary jurisdiction claims during
a drug tort case, the judge should decide whether the FDA made its
initial approval decision with as much information as is available dur-
ing trial. Thus, the judge's decision should allow for civil discovery of
the defendant's medical knowledge before and after FDA approval.
Discovery could reveal evidence of drug safety doubts within the con-
48 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
49 Final agency action on the requested FDA determination would be reviewable. See
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000).
50 See supra notes 10-16, 26-27 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 9, 25-26 and accompanying text.





tract research organization, the hospital that housed the clinical study,
the manufacturer itself, or inside the medical community. Allowing
the jury to hear such doubts and the defendant's responses to them
would more justly resolve tort disputes than giving the defense a pre-
emptive strike with every FDA approval letter.
WHAT EXPERIENCE TEACHES
Decades of experience with many federal agencies teaches that,
when a judge asks, an agency will invariably assert that regulatory ap-
proval sufficiently assures the public of the adequacy of the regulated
product. When drug industry counsel asserts the primary jurisdiction
defense, the trial judge should keep in mind that the defendant's ap-
proval negotiations with the FDA preceded the injury by several years.
Thus, the scientific knowledge about the risks of that drug will likely
have improved by the time of trial.
Delay is inherent to the system of drug products liability. Pre-
scribing physicians usually provide data on the adverse effects of drugs
and devices to the product sponsor before they provide them to the
FDA. So too, sponsors likely pay much closer attention to the market-
place experience of their drug than the actual capability of the FDA
reviewing division. If the sponsor consciously misleads the FDA or se-
lectively shares safety data with the FDA, the agency might in rare
cases charge fraud;5 5 however, courts have not permitted plaintiffs to
use claims of fraud on the FDA to support their cause of action.56
NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO APPROVAL
The fallacy that underlies the preemption debate57 is that all
drug approvals reflect a measured scientific evaluation. But veterans
of the system will confess that approval of specific drugs often results
from great advocacy and only modest data. 58 For example, well-ar-
gued, persistent efforts to gain approval might move the Office of
Drug Evaluation to sign off on a drug, even over objections from re-
55 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 702, 21 U.S.C. § 372 (2000) (empower-
ing the FDA to investigate fraud); see also id. §§ 302, 303(a), 303(f)(1)(A), 304(a) (2) (D),
332, 333(a), 333(f) (1) (A), 334(a) (2) (D) (empowering the FDA to respond in various ways
to findings of fraud).
56 See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (concluding
that Congress has preempted "fraud-on-the-FDA claims").
57 Elsewhere in this issue, I dissect the controversial attempt of the drug industry to
stretch the limits of the implied preemption doctrine during the current Bush Administra-
tion. See O'Reilly, supra note 8, at Part III.
58 1 am not suggesting that the FDA routinely approves bad drugs. Rather, I am sug-
gesting that, based on my observations during more than three decades working with the
FDA review process, advocacy is a very important factor in drug approval-perhaps even
more important than the sufficiency of data in support of clinical testing end points.
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viewers in the specialized drug review divisions.59 Although records of
this are discoverable, they are often exempt from public disclosure. 60
Thus, the public generally sees only the Wizard side of the Oz-like
FDA, not the FDA action behind the curtain that actually led to
approval.
Some preemption advocates seem to view the FDA's new drug
approval process as analogous to the religious rituals for conferring
sainthood inside the Vatican. To knowledgeable observers of the
FDA, however, the negotiation of a new drug application (NDA) is
every bit as subjective and eclectic as any governmental choice can be.
Before the government building security upgrades of the last decade,
"hall-walker" representatives from the several major drug companies
had easy access to the offices of drug reviewers. At lunch and dinner
conversations, drug company representatives and drug reviewers de-
bated the need for greater efficacy proofs, and final label approval was
as much an art of negotiation as it was a science of clinical data analy-
sis. The hall-walker "won" when the drug company received the final
approval letter,61 which allowed it to immediately ship the stockpiled
product filling its warehouses into the waiting distribution channels of
the market. The bribery and fraud cases of FDA drug approvals in
1989,62 however, ultimately led to the establishment of a more formal-
ized system of drug sponsor and drug reviewer interactions.
That said, there is a procedural benefit to Professor Struve's pro-
posed system. Preemption advocates have sometimes naively assumed
that the motives behind NDA reviewer actions were pure, not even
allowing for a hearing to examine the initial approval. In contrast,
primary jurisdiction advocates would at least allow for a hearing at
which opponents could expose the realities of the initial approval
59 The FDA's internal personnel rewards program and its recognition of those manag-
ers who meet the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA) schedules also affect
the agency's level of resistance to drug approval. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 736, 21 U.S.C. § 379h.
60 See 21 C.F.R. § 3 14 .4 3 0(g) (2007) (listing data and information that is unavailable
for public disclosure).
61 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(d) (stating that one cannot introduce a drug into interstate
commerce without first receiving an approval letter).
62 In 1994, prosecutors obtained nine guilty pleas and a tenth conviction after investi-
gators discovered that FDA reviewers had received cash in return for approval actions. See
Prison Term for Inspector in Bribe Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at A55. In response, FDA
leaders committed to strengthen the ethical conduct of the review process. See David A.
Kessler, Remarks by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327, 327 (1995)
(stressing his duty to "rebuild the agency's credibility after the generic drug scandal");
Louis W. Sullivan, Remarks by the Secretary of Health and Human Services at the Food and Drug
Law Institute's 33rd Annual Educational Conference, 45 FooD DRUG CosM. LJ. 1, 4 (1990) ("I
am... troubled by the revelation of illegalities [that] threaten to compromise the integrity
of the FDA .... I will not tolerate bribery, fraud, or other illegalities or improprieties.").
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before a judge could find the approval process sufficient and hold
that the plaintiff's claim was preempted.
GATEKEEPER ROLES
Primary jurisdiction has as its core the displacement of juries'
opinions on the adequate safety of drugs with judges' acceptance of
FDA scientific assessments of product risks and benefits. The societal
choice reflected in the 1938 Act and its several amendments63 was that
there should be a technical gatekeeper to evaluate drug company sub-
missions. 64 But as the FDA's drug review process has become more
complex, the Act has required increasingly more skilled reviewers
than Congress has been willing to fund. 65 This problem led to the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA). 66 While the
shortage of personnel and expertise has improved somewhat in the
post-PDUFA era, FDA review is still not the idealized calculus of pure
science that outsiders might presume.
Consider what juries and expert witnesses see in the exhibits at a
drug tort trial. The incentive for a plaintiff to prevail on a failure-to-
warn claim drives an extensive presentation about adverse data in the
NDA file.6 7 But even by the time of the plaintiffs injury, which is
often years after the drug was marketed, all relevant data on the drug
still may not have reached the FDA.68 And the plaintiffs experts, who
may once have been drug review officials inside the FDA, might opine
to the jury about the relevance of the unreported information to the
decision process as a whole. Finally, the defendant is free to blast
back against the plaintiff's aggressive search for records.
63 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
64 For the historical background of the 1938 Act's gatekeeper role, see 1 JAMES T.
O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION §§ 3:4, 13:2 (3d ed. 2007).
65 See Gardiner Harris, For FD.A., a Major Backlog Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at
A15 ("In the last 14 years, the drug agency has lost 1,311 employees and nearly $300 mil-
lion in appropriations to inflation while Congress has passed more than 100 laws defining
or expanding its regulatory responsibilities.").
66 Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491.
67 Much of the failure-to-warn litigation relates to the gap between the time of the
defendant's notice of the risk and the time that the defendant communicated the risk to
prescribing physicians. SeeJAMES M. BECK & A-rHoNY VALE, DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE
PRODUCr LIABILITY DESKBOOK § 2.04[1] (2004).
68 The 2007 amendments to the PDUFA may, however, improve the quantity and
timeliness of incoming risk reports. See Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 825 (2007) (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g-379h (2000))
(expanding the duty to provide adequate post-marketing information about drugs). In
addition, the parties could find more of the data on post-approval experiences by search-
ing company and contractor files obtained in civil discovery.
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DISCOVERY Is BETTER THAN VOLUNTARY SUBMISSIONS
Overall, the expensive, messy, and difficult process of civil discov-
ery does a better job of uncovering flaws in drug approval decisions
than does the FDA's time-sensitive drug review process. Contingency-
fee arrangements give the plaintiffs attorneys direct incentives to dis-
cover facts relevant to causation: if the manufacturer did not cause the
plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiffs attorney will not want to pursue
the claim because it has a high risk of nonpayment.
Conversely, in the FDA process, reviewers have an incentive to act
quickly69 and, as a result, a disincentive to find flaws and identify
shortcomings in drug applications. Moreover, the applicant's funds
ultimately pay for the FDA drug reviewer's salary, albeit indirectly via
the wizardry of federal accounting practices. 70 For example, the FDA
ties the individual reviewer's rewards to the "productivity" of review
and approval7 1-potentially creating a great conflict of interest. In
the current climate of faster clearance times, FDA reviewers have a
disincentive to criticize drug industry data presentations.
Moreover, plaintiffs have an incentive to use experts to find the
flaws in a new drug application even though the FDA may have missed
them. With these contrasting incentives in mind, I question why the
courts would use a doctrine like preemption or primary jurisdiction to
lessen the jury's role in determining the adequacy of warnings.
69 See FDA, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION, FY 1998 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO
CONGRESS app. B [hereinafter FDA, FY 1998 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS], available
at http://www.fda.gov/ope/pdufa/report98/appendb.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (es-
tablishing twenty-nine performance goals based on timing).
70 The statutory reauthorization of PDUFA provides for much of the funding of the
drug review process. See § 103(e), 121 Stat. at 831. In recent years, congressional critics
have noted that fifty percent of FDA drug regulation budgets came from user fees. See, e.g.,
Maurice Hinchey, Improving the Food and Drug Administration, http://www.house.gov/
hinchey/issues/fdareformbill.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); see also Food and Drug
Administration Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 2090, 109th Cong. (2005) (arguing that
fees paid by drug manufacturers should be placed in the general treasury). Now, FDA
drug review funding comes from the allocation of receipts of the user fee payments under
PDUFA, rather than from the more traditional budget appropriations of general fund tax
receipts. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 67-68
(2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/hhs.pdf; see
also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 123 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy7/pdf/budget/hhs.pdf ("Since the authori-
zation of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, the collection of fees has been
critical in leading to performance improvement in drug review.").
71 Critics of the PDUFA process have argued that FDA perceptions are skewed in
favor of approval. Representative Maurice Hinchey has been a stalwart critic of the admin-
istration of the fee-based drug approval process. See Maurine Hinchey, Hinchey Introduces
Sweeping 1DA Reform Measure, May 10, 2007, http://www.hoise.gov/apps/list/press/
ny22_hinchey/morenews/051007FDALAintro.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (arguing
that the FDA is not fully accountable to U.S. taxpayers because it must collect fees from
drug companies in order to fully function).
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PROBLEMS WITH DIVERTING CASES
The recent suggestion by a drug industry defense counsel that
the FDA should initially assess failure-to-warn tort claims 72 is an un-
realistic diversion for three reasons. First, more facts will always be
available at the time of injury than on the time of approval.
Second, because of its limited resources, the FDA could not pri-
oritize tort-based inquiries. In the past, all FDA employees received
their salaries from the federal government's domestic discretionary
budget. 73 Today, in contrast, the PDUFA statutory scheme rewards
the leaders of the drug review division for complying with a congres-
sionally set timetable.74 Because PDUFA does not reward tort claim
referrals, the FDA would not likely receive sufficient resources to sup-
port Professor Struve's hypothetical legislation. Granted, such legisla-
tion could devote money from user fees to pay for FDA screening of
litigated claims. But this would diminish the primary role intended
for these funds by PDUFA.75
Last, an FDA team separate from the approving division conducts
post-marketing review of new drug experiences, in the conscious sepa-
ration of functions. 76 This team's workload has already begun to
grow. It is unclear whether adding tort referrals to the team's respon-
sibilities would lead to a full appraisal of risks, or simply to a restate-
ment of the self-serving rationale that led to the initial approval.
CONCLUSION
Professor Struve's article merits close attention from courts faced
with a defensive claim of FDA primary jurisdiction. If Congress passes
her hypothetical legislation, should the courts defer and await FDA
evaluations? I think not, because the FDA is not likely to give a timely
or unequivocal response to such referrals. The costs of further litiga-
tion delay and the high likelihood of an equivocal response make Pro-
fessor Struve's proposal less desirable than the current method of
airing opposing views before a jury.
We must acknowledge that the drug approval process is a series of
intense negotiations. The FDA is no Oz, and those who would with-
72 See William A. Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warnings, and Frauds, 58
RUTGERS L. REv. 615, 644 (2006).
73 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 71 (2007),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/hhs.pdf.
74 See FDA, FY 1998 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 69.
75 Litigation screening is not included among the functions to be paid by the fees. See
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 735(7), 21 U.S.C. § 37 9g(7) (2000).
76 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring
Drugs Are Safe and Effective, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402_drug.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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hold tort remedies from juries must justify their position in light of
these realities. The better solution is to let the jury look behind the
curtain.
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